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Abstract
The TanDEM-X project is implemented by a “Public-Private Partnership” between the 
German Aerospace Centre (DLR) and Astrium GmbH.
The primary goal of the TanDEM-X (TerraSAR-X add-on for Digital Elevation 
Measurem ent) mission is to generate a global digital elevation model. To achieve 
this, two satellites – TerraSAR-X (TSX) and TanDEM-X (TD X), satellites of almost 
identical construction in orbit since June 2007 and June 2010 respectively – form the 
first configurable SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) interferometer in space with a 
separation of only a few hundred metres. A powerful ground segment, which is 
interlaced with that of TSX, completes the TanDEM-X s ystem. The satellites fly in  
close form ation since December 2010 and will be operated in parallel for three years 
to cover the entire surface of the Earth.
DLR is responsible for the scientific exploitation of the TSX/TDX data, as well as for 
planning and im plementing the mission, for controlling the two satellites and for 
generating the digital elevation model. Astrium has built the satellites and shares in 
the costs of development and exploitation. The responsibility for marketing the data 
lies in the hands of Infoterra GmbH, a subsidiary of Astrium GmbH.
AOCS operations for two spacecraft flying at low altitude with such unprecedented 
small separations pose several challenges and required creative solutions, mostly 
stipulated by the fact that the original mission was not designed for formation flight. 
Several on-ground safety measures were installed, but due to the short reaction 
times emphasis lies with the on-board handling of problems. This is achieved by 
implementation of a data link (one-way) between the satellites, by the regular 
interchange of a “health” signal (two-way), by the design of a new AOCS safe mode 
that has no effect on the orbit, by the complete re-work of the FDIR concept (Fault
Detection, Isolation and Recovery on-board) and by autonomous formation control.
Emphasis in this paper is on the implemented safety measures, specifically the FDIR 
concept which will be presented in Section 1.5.2. and on the routine AOCS 
operations during close formation flight (Section 2). No major contingencies have 
occurred in the formation so far – something we don’t want to change in the future 
either – but s om e minor operational issues did occur, which will be presented in 
Section 3. Section 4 finally gives some conclusions and an outlook on the way 
forward.
   
1. Introduction
1.1. Launch and reference orbit
TerraSar-X was launched from Baikonur on June 15, 2007 in a Sun-synchronous
dusk-dawn orbit at an altitude of about 515km. Ground coverage is repeated in an 
eleven day cycle, which is achieved by controlling the spacecraft in a ±250m tube 
around a prescribed Earth-fixed reference orbit [7].
The second satellite was also launched from Baikonur almost exactly three years  
after the first, namely on June 21, 2010. The initial distance of 16000km was soon 
reduced, a first form ation at <2km was  reached mid of October and the TanDEM 
mission proper started in December 2010 with an inter-satellite distance of ~300m
(see [8] for formation acquisition).
TDX hard- and software are a rebuild of TSX, but some significant changes were 
made to enable close formation flight. The major changes in the AOCS comprise:
 Cold gas system with 2x4 0.04N thrusters for formation-keeping manoeuvres; the 
thrusters are located on the spacecraft’s length axis at the front- and back-sides.
 S-band receiver / decoder for TSX telemetry via inter-satellite link (ISL); 35 words 
with about 120 of the most important health parameters are relayed.
 Algorithms for autonomous formation flight; GPS measurements are used for orbit 
determ ination, prediction and planning of cold gas manoeuvres.
1.2 Instrument Operations
SAR data takes are normally made under a 33.8° looking angle towards the dark side 
of the Earth (“right-looking” or NOM-RL), but it is also possible to roll the spacecraft 
over 67.6° to make a so-called “Sun-side-looking”, or “left-looking” data take (also 
NOM-SSL; see Fig. 1 for an example). Images can be made in several instrum ent 
modes and spacecraft formations with ground resolution ranging from ~0.5m to 16m 
and an area covered from ~50km
2
 to 104km
2
. A more detailed description of the 
several options can be found in [6] and [11].
The attitude in the standard operational modes is controlled within 0.3mrad (3σ) 
using Astro 10 star trackers from Jena-Optronik GmbH and four reaction wheels from 
Rockwell Collins Deutschland GmbH with a torque capability of 0.2Nm. Continuous 
wheel unloading is performed with the magnetic torque rods that are mounted parallel 
to the spacecraft’s axes. A Mosaic GPS receiver from Astrium  GmbH is used for 
position and velocity determination, as well as for the time synchronisation on-board
(see [2] for a detailed description of all sensors and actuators).
1.3 Orbit correction manoeuvres and formation-keeping
TSX was during the first three years and still is controlled on its reference orbit
(Section 1.1). Orbit correction manoeuvres are made with a hydrazine propulsion 
system, which is pressurised by helium and operated in blow-down mode. The 
thrusters are arranged in two branches with four 1N thrusters each that are all 
located at the rear of the satellite (not visible in Fig. 1, which is a front view). 
Inclination manoeuvres, or manoeuvres in anti-flight direction thus require a ±90° or 
180° yaw slew. All hydrazine manoeuvres on TSX are mirrored on TDX as long as 
they are in close formation.
TDX has an almost identical orbit, but it describes a helix around the first satellite’s 
trajectory. The relative helical orbit is achieved by so-called e-,i-vector separation 
(relative eccentricity / relative inclination, whereby maximum cross-track separation 
occurs at the equator and maximum radial separation at the poles [5,8,9,10]). Both  
spacecraft carry out the standard hydrazine manoeuvres with the same Δv (velocity 
increment), which due to their different ages and hence remaining hydrazine 
pressure are realised with distinct thruster on-tim es. In addition, formation keeping- or 
reconfiguration- manoeuvres are made by TDX alone with the cold gas system, 
which comprises two 0.04N thrusters on front and back each (see Section 2.3. for the 
practical im plementation).
1.4. Communication between the two spacecraft
1.4.1. Inter-satellite link
The existing S-band downlink system on TSX is used to relay important health data  
to a dedicated receiver/decoder added on TDX. Note that the traffic is one-way, 
because a corresponding receiver is not available on TSX. A full description of the 
ISL can be found in [1] and some of the limitations are listed in [6].
1.4.2. Sync pulses
Bi-static operations, where the SAR signals of the one spacecraft are also detected 
by the other, require synchronous processing of both data takes. The synchronous 
start of data takes is achieved by exchanging “sync pulses” based upon the GPS 
sync signal at a rate of ~5 Hz (configurable). Sync pulses are transmitted and 
received by six horns, which are mounted in such a way that 4π steradians coverage  
is achieved. Best signal-to-noise ratio is obtained by selecting the appropriate pair.
Figure 1. Illustration of a DEM dat a take; one of the satellites sends radar pulses 
illuminating a swath, or a hot spot on the Earth’s surface. The back-scatter is detected by 
both SAR antennae enabling the construction of a digital elevation model. The orientation 
of the satellites indicates that in this case a “left-looking” dat a take is made. Note that 
pulses can only be sent if the second spac ecraft is not in the beam. In a special 
application pulses are sent alternating from each spacecraft and received by both. No 
other configurations will be routinely used, apart from the stand-alone mode [11].     
1.4.3. Sync warning data takes
Sync warning data takes are normal, albeit very short, data takes where the signal is 
sent out by one satellite and detected by the second. Again a selected pair of sync 
horns is used for this operation and not the SAR instrument. A positive result will 
allow SAR data takes on the receiving side for the next 50 minutes.
The aim of regular sync warning data takes is to detect any problem – e.g. a drop to 
AOCS safe mode – on the sending satellite in which case instrument operations on 
the receiving spacecraft will immediately be suspended.
1.5 Safety Measures
The two m ajor risks for spacecraft flying at a separation of the order of a few hundred 
meters only are:
 Instrum ent damage by radiation; a direct hit of the SAR signal, which delivers 
pulses of kW strength, in the instrument of the second satellite would be up to 
nine orders of magnitude stronger than the normally detected back-scatter from  
the Earth’s surface, which is of the order of μW.
 Collision; uncontrolled changes of the orbit can lead to a considerable increase of 
the collision risk.
Both points are primarily guarded against by avoiding uncontrolled orbital changes.
This is achieved by an AOCS safe mode that doesn’t use the thrusters accompanied 
by an elaborate FDIR scheme. Frequent contacts and permanent on-call support by 
key personnel will in every “nominal” contingency case suffice to prevent any thruster  
activity at all. Radiation damage is furthermore prevented by implementation of so-
called exclusion zones, orbital regions where the sending of radar pulses is forbidden 
to one of the satellites and by inhibiting signals to be sent out in case of problems.
1.5.1. Magnetorquer safe mode (ASM-MTQ)
A second safe mode branch was implemented on both satellites with the magnetic 
torque rods as the sole actuators [2]. It still uses CESS, magnetometer and IMU as 
sensors, just like the original thruster-based safe mode (ASM-RCS). The torque rods  
and m agnetometers are operated in alternation to allow disturbance free 
measurem ents of the Earth’s magnetic field.
The concept has been extensively tested in flight on both spacecraft under quite  
harsh circumstances. One satellite was for example sent into ASM-MTQ at maximum 
yaw slew velocity of 0.5°/s near the South-Pole, where control of the yaw-axis with 
magnetorquers is impossible. Still, the mode proved to be robust and full stabilisation 
was obtained within two orbits. ASM-MTQ thus presents the possibility to avoid 
orbital changes completely in case of an AOCS safe mode entry.
1.5.2 FDIR concept
The FDIR concept for close formation flight is shown in Fig. 2. The major changes 
with respect to the original TSX implementation are:
 The magnetorquer safe mode (ASM-MTQ).
 Lim ited thruster on-time at first thruster-based safe mode (ASM-RCS) entry.
 Surveillance of the ISL, TAFF (on-board algorithms for autonomous formation 
flight), s ync pulses and sync warning data takes.
 System -level reactions, comprising safety measures  in several sub-systems in 
parallel. The reactions also extend to the second satellite, where e.g. data takes 
will be inhibited in case of a safe mode on the first. 
 Additional power/thermal monitoring functions.
Entry point in case of problems in one of the operational modes will always be ASM-
MTQ-RD (rate damping in magnetorquer safe mode). This will first of all suspend all 
payload operations on both satellites (the second one via ISL or missing sync 
warnings). A board-autonomous sequence will bring the spacecraft in Earth/Sun  
acquisition m ode (ASM-MTQ-AQ) once the rotation rates are below a certain 
threshold that is currently set at 0.14°/s. If the rates are not below the specified limit 
after ~3 orbits, an on-board computer (OBC) warm boot is triggered after which the 
spacecraft returns to ASM-MTQ. Only after a 5
th
 OBC reboot the thruster-based safe 
mode with un-limited Δv will be invoked.
A second board-autonomous transition into the operational modes occurs when full 
stabilisation could be achieved in ASM-MTQ-AQ (Earth- and Sun-pointing ≤10° and 
≤15° respectively, and rates ≤0.074°/s).
Figure 2. FDIR scheme used f or formation flight on bot h satellites. The nominal 
operational mode is on top of the diagram (see also [ 2], their figure 8.2-7) 
Som e unlikely circumstances could necessitate leaving ASM-MTQ for ASM-RCS (at 
first with limited on-time). The cases are a) rotation rates >2°/s that can’t be handled 
by the torquers, b) non-convergence after three orbits and c) violations of critical 
power or thermal constraints (see also [6]). Then the thruster-based safe mode is 
invoked, but with a total Δv limited to an amount that can not threaten the formation. 
The spacecraft is put into ASM-SS (steady state in ASM-RCS, which uses – almost –
solely the torquers) indefinitely if full convergence is reached with the limited amount 
of Δv. If this was not yet the case when the Δv limit is reached, an OBC warm boot is 
made after which another try in magnetorquer safe mode begins (this time with 
som ewhat wider power/thermal limits).
This sequence is tried only once. When there is still no convergence, or the power / 
thermal problem persists a transition to ASM-RCS with unlimited thruster on-tim e is 
made as a last resort. The extremely unlikely cases in which the unlimited thruster 
safe m ode could be reached are listed in [6] (one exam ple would be both
magnetom eters defunct).
1.5.3. Station coverage
The FDIR concept dictates the desired interval between contacts. The current 
implementation normally guarantees at least 2x3 orbits, or roughly ten hours in total  
during which no, or at m ost limited, orbital changes will occur when the satellite drops 
to safe mode. Contacts are therefore separated by s ix hours at the most allowing 
timely discovery and recovery to be m ade (see [4] and [6] for more details).
1.5.4. On-call strategy and automatic data surveillance
An extended on-call service is provided for the TanDEM m ission. A complete 
description can be found in [4]. Data surveillance will be discussed in Section 2.1.
1.5.5. Exclusion zones
Radiation damage is also avoided by prohibiting data takes when the second satellite 
is passing through the beam of the first. Both “right-looking” and “left-looking” must of 
course be accounted for. The duration for crossing the exclusion zone depends upon 
inter-satellite distance and along-track separation. The extent is roughly ±30° and it is 
directed either to the dark, or to the illuminated side of the Earth depending upon 
whether a normal, or a left-looking data take is planned. A considerable safety margin
is comprised within the 60°. The exclusion zones are made even larger (e.g. ±45°) 
after orbit manoeuvres. An illustration is given in Fig. 3, where the formation is seen 
along the flight trajectory. Checks are performed not only on ground when planning 
the data takes, but also on-board before they will actually be executed.
Figure 3.  An example is shown of TDX just exiting the exclusion zones of TSX. View is 
along the flight trajectory with TSX fixed at the centre. The two areas show the exclusion 
zone for the “right -looking” and “left-looking” modes of TSX, respectively and are ±30° 
each.
2. Routine operations
2.1. AOCS surveillance
Hundreds of variable parameters, such as attitude errors, actuator commands, 
sensor performance, etc., are continuously monitored on-board. Limit violations are 
flagged yellow or red during contacts, depending upon the severity. Dum p files 
covering 100% of the tim e are screened with the same limit settings and an 
automatic E-mail notification with detailed inform ation is sent out to responsible 
personnel in case a violation is detected.
Several hundred AOCS parameters more can be commanded to a desired setting, 
but will normally rem ain constant for a longer time. These parameters are dumped at 
least once per day and compared with a file containing the currently desired settings. 
The complete AOCS FDIR tables are dum ped at least once per week and also 
com pared with the defaults. These routinely m ade checks safeguard against 
spontaneous bit-flips on the one and against commanding errors on the other hand.
2.2. Resources, analysis and parameter adjustment
Routine AOCS operations furthermore comprise offline calculation and administration 
of the expended cold gas and hydrazine fuel as well as the registration of the number 
of thruster cycles and mode switches. Use of resources is converted into a mission 
life expectancy (see Fig. 4 for an example). Long-term analyses are made among 
others of CESS and reaction wheel performance leading e.g. to parameter 
adjustm ent or lubrication to reduce friction.
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Figure 4.  Cold gas expenditure as computed from t he tank pressure and temperature is 
shown as a thick blue line. The onset of the close formation four months after launch is 
clearly visible. The other lines show the fuel usage expected for several mission 
durations. It can be seen that the 3 years required to complete the DEM (digital elevation 
model) of  the Earth are easily attained.
Several parameters need regular updates, e.g. because of seasonal or secular 
variation, because of formation changes, or due to pressure dependency. A good
example is the lim it for the on-time in ASM-RCS’s first entry (see Section 1.5.2.). The  
allowed amount of Δv (e.g. in cm/s) depends of course on the actual formation and 
inter-satellite distance. The corresponding FDIR limit on-board is set in seconds of 
thruster on-time, however. The conversion of velocity increment into seconds 
depends upon the hydrazine pressure, which is decreasing with time and is also 
different for TSX and TD X.
2.3. Manoeuvres
The strategy for orbit correction and form ation keeping manoeuvres was discussed in 
Section 1.3. Here the practical implementation is presented.
2.3.1. Simultaneous orbit corrections (hydrazine)
These manoeuvres are calculated by the flight dynamics group, who also send out an 
E-m ail announcing that a sim ultaneous burn on both satellites is planned. The 
operators have to confirm the upload of both AOCS procedures that actually perform 
the manoeuvres on-board. The procedures contain two build-in safeties; a heater 
switch-off command after a fixed time and a timer set to a value just over the desired 
on-time. Both would interrupt any ongoing manoeuvre and thus guard against 
commanding errors. An FDIR will close the entire branch if a thruster is stuck open.
Another FDIR, finally, which is available on TDX only, checks shortly beforehand via 
ISL whether the propulsion system on TSX is ready to perform the manoeuvre. If 
such is not the case, it will inhibit the manoeuvre on TDX also. 
Data takes are prohibited in a certain time window (roughly 10 min. without slew) 
around hydrazine manoeuvres. It is also guaranteed that any underperformance on 
either satellite (down to no burn at all!) does not enhance collision (planning of 
location and size) or radiation risk (increase of exclusion zones). 
2.3.2. Form ation keeping (cold gas)
Execution problems on the cold gas manoeuvres do not have such grave 
consequences as for the hydrazine system, the thrusters being a factor of 25 weaker.
Still, safety measures are in place, that limit the total number of manoeuvres per orbit
and also the duration of each individual burn to 300s, which yields a maxim um  Δv
that can not threaten the formation. Passive safety is given by the fact that the  
form ation is stable for at least a week (9.5 days are actually expected) without any 
manoeuvres at all. This also safeguards against failed, or only partially carried out 
cold gas m anoeuvres.
TDX furthermore carries a software module with algorithms for the on-board 
determ ination of its own orbit relative to TSX. The so-called TAFF (for TanDEM 
autonomous form ation flight) uses data from the Mosaic GPS receivers on both 
spacecraft. It can not only determine and predict the relative helical orbit, but also 
com pute the necessary cold gas manoeuvres to keep the prescribed formation and 
ultim ately carry these out autonomously. 
A first successful try of full on-board autonomy was made from 29 until 31 March  
2011 with the two spacecraft at a distance of about 250 m (a full description of this in-
orbit test is given in [3]). The limits within the TAFF module were taken even tighter 
than in the FDIR scheme; e.g. the maximum burn time was set to 90s.
3. Contingencies
The good news is that both satellites are operating so well that there have been no 
appreciable contingencies while in close formation. The last time a drop to safe mode 
occurred was 13.08.2010 on TDX with the inter-satellite distance still 20 km , when 
due to an unexplained blinding all three star cameras did not deliver data for several  
minutes. This provided an extra in-orbit test of the magnetorquer safe m ode and gave  
us the opportunity to improve on one of the FDIRs, which performs a mode re-
initialisation at the moment one of the three cameras starts delivering data again.
TDX lost one star camera on 11.02.2011 (more likely the LCL and not the camera is 
defunct), but it still has two other cameras that work perfectly well.
A number of deviations of the order of several hundred meters were seen in the 
solutions of the GPS receivers, which would be a problem if formation control is done 
autonomously on-board (Section 2.3.2.). The cause was the inclusion of GPS 
satellites with large negative elevation in the solutions. By increasing the elevation 
limit from -20° to -10° the deviations could be reduced by an order of magnitude.
4. Conclusions
TSX and TDX are successfully flying in close formation since half a year now and all 
safety measures, precautions and stringent surveillance proved to be of theoretical  
importance only so far. Everybody in the project wants to keep it this way!
Still, the safety measures and concepts developed for the form ation flight have  
proved to be well thought out and worked very well when tested on the spacecraft 
simulator or in orbit.
The successful in-orbit test of autonomous formation flight in March this year might 
make the continuous computation and upload of formation keeping manoeuvres by 
the flight dynamics team obsolete in the near future.
The tracking of available resources shows that, even with the currently increasing 
solar activity, the mission goal of at least three years formation flight to obtain a full 
digital elevation model of the Earth can easily be attained.
The commercial and scientific success of the TerraSAR and TanDEM missions are 
an incentive for several follow-up and sim ilar missions. Currently PAZ, a copy of TSX, 
is built for Spain, Russia contemplates having two SAR satellites, and the successor 
to TSX will be TX2. Plans are made of flying with larger appliances or in formations 
with more than two satellites.
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